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Genres of justification 
Jutta Schickore
IU Bloomington
At times celebrated as the hallmark of philosophical approaches to science, at times
condemned as ambiguous and damaging, the distinction between the contexts of
discovery and justification has permeated philosophical debates since the early decades
of the twentieth century (Reichenbach 1938) and caused much turmoil and despair.
Even in the twenty-first century, no agreement has been reached as to whether the
distinction is a useful or indeed indispensable conceptual tool for the analysis of science,
whether it is irrelevant, or whether it is in fact detrimental for philosophy. Historically
minded philosophers have been particularly strongly opposed to the distinction because
it seemingly obstructs any attempt to promote historically or, more generally, empirically
informed philosophy of science by driving a wedge between the investigation of actual
scientific research and normative epistemology. I argue that on the contrary, the
distinction properly conceived requires the collaboration between historians and
philosophers of science.
In the philosophical literature, it is common to distinguish between two versions of the
distinction: the temporal or process distinction between two consecutive processes of
discovery and justification, and the version according to which two attitudes towards
science, normative and descriptive, need to be distinguished (Hoyningen-Huene 1987,
2006). The normative task is to lay down the rules for theory structure, confirmation,
and test, and to reconstruct fully developed scientific theories in terms of these rules;
the descriptive task is to describe what actually happened in science.
Most historians and philosophers reject the temporal version of the distinction as
empirically inadequate. Many philosophers agree, however, that the distinction between
normative and descriptive attitudes towards science is convincing and worth keeping. In
contrast, I argue that while it is conceptually awkward to oppose the process of
discovery with the process of justification, there is at least one important element of the
process distinction that needs to be considered and preserved in accounts of scientific
knowledge production: the difference between the generation of knowledge claims in
actual research and the exposition of the outcome of that research, for example in
research papers. This distinction is worth keeping because it highlights a key epistemic
feature of the processes of knowledge production: the mismatch between what is going
on in the lab or at the bench and the reasoning that is presented in the scientific
publication.
My paper examines a range of approaches to the mismatch between research practice
and the exposition of knowledge claims (among others, Reichenbach 1938, Medawar
1964, Knorr-Cetina 1981, Suppe 1998, Franklin and Howson 1998, Lipton 1998). The
survey shows that most historians and philosophers agree that the scientific publication,
not the laboratory, is the site where scientists present what they believe to be their
strongest justifications. But it is also clear that only very rarely, a period of research
leads to one single identifiable textual outcome. There may be a string of research
papers emerging from one project, the first research reports in conference proceedings
may be followed by Nature papers, research articles, synoptic articles, review articles,
synthetic expositions in handbooks, and new research proposals.
We may expect that the exposition of justificatory arguments varies with the textual
genre in question: Justifications that are provided in the textbook will be different from
justificatory activities that were offered in the first research reports. The transition from
the research article to the textbook may be regarded as a process of justification by
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decontextualization and reconstruction that the scientists themselves undertake. In
most all scientific texts we will find some kind of justification for the knowledge claims
that are expounded. Needless to say, textual genres also have histories. Forms of
exposition change over time: textbooks and journal articles from the early nineteenth
century look very different from those of today (Bazerman 1988).
The philosophically intricate question that arises is the following: Are any of these forms
of justification ‘more scientific’ than others, and why? Should we exclude certain kinds of
publications (e.g. the research proposal, the popular article) from the analysis of
scientists’ justificatory moves, and on what grounds? How should one acknowledge that
textual genres and journal guidelines impinge on scientists’ justificatory moves? What
should be counted as successful justification, after all? I argue that to answer these
questions, philosophical and empirical studies of (past) science must be combined in a
bootstrapping procedure. The separation between normative and descriptive attitudes,
while convincing in the abstract, is not viable in the actual analysis of science. To
analyze fully how scientists validate their claims to knowledge, we need to be sensitive
to different genres of scientific texts. We need to trace how scientists communicate
scientific findings to different audiences and for different purposes. We need to analyze
the formalized reconstructions in the journal article and the justificatory norms and
strategies inherent in guidelines for scientific publications and research proposals and
compare and contrast them with the forms of decontextualisation in the vademecum,
textbook, and popular magazines. We need to trace how forms of exposition change
over time. Finally, we also need to engage with the concepts of justification that
philosophers of science have developed and explicated.
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